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Abstract
We test the relationship between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in
the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries. Exclusive agreements come in
bundles, are reciprocal and are passed on up- or downstream. The type of exclusivity
employed by a firm depends on its position in the supply chain. Downstream firms are more
likely to be subject to and/or impose vertical restraints. Technology trickles upstream:
Multinational final assemblers transfer a lot of technology; lower-tier suppliers less.
Technology transfer is negatively related to the exclusive agreements that should protect it,
suggesting a certain incidence of anti- rather than pro-competitive motives. Complementary
case studies reveal three possible motives for vertical restraints. Owners of technology protect
their intellectual property; recipients of technology protect investments in relation-specific
assets; and either or both engage in attempts to increase market power. This has implications
for competition policy in an enlarging Europe.
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1Introduction
When firms employ vertical restraints (VRs) such as exclusive agreements the outcome may
be pro- or anti-competitive. Ideally, an associated transfer of technology (TT) results in
efficiency gains from which ultimately consumers benefit. But exclusive agreements also lend
themselves to the creation or abuse of market power. Which of the two outcomes prevails is of
concern to competition authorities, such as the European Commission. In the context of
European Union enlargement, it is also of concern to policymakers in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) for VRs used by multinational firms in foreign direct investments (FDI) may
affect the accrual of gains between countries. We address these issues by analysing the
incidence of exclusive agreements in automotive supplier networks in CEE, and how it is
related to transfer of technology or know-how.
We find that exclusive agreements come in bundles. A firm that uses exclusivity is in
turn also likely to be subjected to exclusivity. Thus, exclusive agreements seem to be
reciprocal and to get passed on up or down the supply chain. Links between exclusivity and
technology transfer are relatively weak. Some kinds of exclusivity increase market power but
a firm may also request exclusivity from its customers to protect R&D or asset-specific
investments. The type of exclusive agreements employed by a firm depends on its position in
the supply chain. First-tier suppliers are more prone to request exclusivity from their
customers while lower-tier suppliers are more prone to request it from their own suppliers.
Technology and know-how trickle upstream. There is a lot of technology transfer
upstream from multinational final assemblers and less from suppliers. Unsurprisingly, transfer
of technology and knowledge increases with the complexity of the products, with R&D, and
with the importance of technology. Surprisingly, technology transfer is negatively related to
the exclusive agreements that should protect the transfer, suggesting in these cases anti- rather
than pro-competitive motives.
In the remainder of the paper, we first briefly review the rationale for – and the
justification of – exclusive agreements, and how they are regulated in EU competition law.
We then describe competition policy in CEE, the international automotive supplier industry,
and car component manufacturing in CEE: changes in all three areas impact on the scope of
the use of VRs in relationships between suppliers and assemblers and among suppliers. In the
empirical part of the paper, we first present our database of East European car component
manufacturers and describe our method of analysis. Second, we discuss a series of results
concerning the determination of exclusivity and TT. Third, we illustrate the rationale behind
VRs and their effect on market competition through a series of case studies. Finally, we
conclude by speculating about possible explanations for the relatively weak link between
exclusivity and TT and suggest directions for further research.
Technology transfer and vertical restraints
Exclusive agreements are vertical restraints that may go both ways. The firm may grant
exclusivity to its customers (it will not sell to their competitors) and it may request exclusivity
from its customers (they should promise not to deal in rivals’ products). Hence, a firm may
experience four different types of exclusive agreements: those that it grants and those that it
requests combined with two “directions”, up- and downstream (see Figure 1).
2Figure 1. – Four types of exclusive agreements
Upstream firm (Supplier, S)
Firm at hand (Respondent, R)
Downstream firm (Customer, C)
Note: Questions 5.1-4 refer to our survey of which more below.
The reasons why a firm may grant or request exclusivity from either its suppliers (S) or
its customers (C) are well known (see Rey & Caballero-Sanz (1996, 30-32) for a recent
survey). For example, it may aim to protect a specific investment (in physical or human
capital, technology or know-how), or to increase market power through vertical foreclosure or
strategies that raise rivals’ costs. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) demonstrate that
exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anti-competitive, or efficiency
enhancing, depending on the setting. In this paper we focus on technology transfer between
firms. A firm may transfer technology or know-how both up- and downstream. Likewise it
may itself receive it from its suppliers and its customers. This technology transfer will allow
the recipient to upgrade its product. When the technology is received from a customer, it will
also allow the recipient to tailor its product to that customer, who in turn may request that the
technology not be used with rivals’ products by insisting on exclusivity. However, if the two
firms have to invest in specific (human) capital to carry out this upgrade, equity links (vertical
integration) are likely to be preferred over vertical restraints, since the implied transfer of
residual rights would benefit those investments (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). For
example, if the product is traded between different firms in the same group, the equity link is
likely to substitute for the exclusive agreement.
ERS
Exclusivity
requested by R,
granted by S
(Question 5.4)
ESR
Exclusivity
requested by S,
granted by R
(Question 5.3)
ECR
Exclusivity
requested by C,
granted by R
(Question 5.1)
ERC
Exclusivity
requested by R,
granted by C
(Question 5.2)
3Exclusivity and technology transfer in EU competition rules
The European Commission (1979), in its notice on certain subcontracting agreements,
exempts from the prohibition of anti-competitive restraints exclusive agreements requested by
a firm insofar as they cover products whose manufacture requires making use of the firm’s
proprietary knowledge, machinery, or equipment. Article 81(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam
does then a priori not apply to a sub-contracting agreement through which the sub-contractor
receives intellectual property rights, know-how, documents, dies, or tools belonging to the
contractor, provided that the subcontractor uses these assets to manufacture a product that
differs with respect to form, functionality, or composition from the product found on the
(spot) market. It is thus material to the a priori presumption of legality that exclusivity be
granted in return for a (broadly defined) transfer of technology.
It is also important that the subcontractor (or supplier) not already be an independent
producer of the product covered by the agreement and that he not be able to source the
technology freely elsewhere. Instead, he must use technical knowledge, designs, or other
specific documentation provided by the contractor (or customer), allowing him to manufacture
a different product. Stipulations that the subcontractor must use the technology or equipment
exclusively for the purposes of the contracting agreement and/or that goods or services
resulting from the technology transfer may only be supplied to the contractor do not violate
Article 81, if the above conditions are met. It is thus important for firms wanting to impose
exclusive agreements that they can rationalise them in terms of technology transfer. For
further discussion of the Commission’s Notice, see e.g. Goyder (1993, 301-3) and Van Bael &
Bellis (1990, Appendix 42).
Vertical Restraints, Technology Transfer,
and Competition Policy in the Transition Economies
For obvious reasons, competition policy has no tradition in the transition economies. Rules
and regulations against the abuse of market power have been slow in coming. According to
the EBRD (1999), competition legislation and enforcement capabilities have made the least
progress of all market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the last decade.
Despite gradual legislative convergence towards EU law in the current pre-accession phase,
competition culture in CEE is still rudimentary. This was even more so in the beginning of the
transition when European multinationals (MNEs) began to invest in CEE. They did so in a
regulatory environment that was clearly different both from their home environment and from
the rules that will govern competition in the applicant countries at the very latest just prior to
joining the EU. For business practice and government policy, this translates into a series of
challenges. Policymakers need to understand the frequency and the impact of vertical
restraints. Managers of multinational and of domestic CEE firms need to ensure that exclusive
agreements they struck in the past adhere to EU law (Møllgaard & Lorentzen, forthcoming).
The impact and the legality of vertical restraints prominently depend on the extent to
which they are linked to technology transfer. For policymakers and managers in CEE, vertical
restraints ideally foster the embeddedness of foreign firms and support local capabilities of
product or process improvements. For foreign investors, they ideally protect their knowledge
assets in what continue to be relatively risky markets (Lorentzen & Møllgaard, forthcoming).
4The Automotive Sector in CEE
The automotive sector in CEE is highly integrated with the world, and especially European,
car industry. Car and car component manufacturing consistently attracted a large share of the
sectoral distribution of inward direct investment (UNCTAD, 1999). Western component
manufacturers followed car assemblers into the East in exchange for the promise of potentially
group-wide supply contracts. To this end, they acquired or teamed up with local firms, thus
facilitating the consolidation of the formerly moribund eastern automotive industry into
internationally competitive manufacturers of both cars and components. In the second half of
the 1990s, trade in parts became the fastest growing component of CEE’s external trade; of
this, automotive parts were the most important. For example, in Poland their share in total
exports and imports of parts to the EU rose by about 60 per cent in 1993-7. The import and
export share of components and final assemblies in this sector also increased (21 per cent for
imports from and fourfold for exports to the EU in the case of Poland). This suggests that
many producers in CEE have become part of an intra-product division of labour organised
around networks centred in the EU (Kaminski & Ng, 1999; see also Eichengreen & Kohl,
1998). The emergence of these networks through foreign direct investments and intra- or inter-
firm trade opens up possibilities for technology transfer and, thus, lends itself to making use of
vertical restraints.
Structural Changes in the Car Component Sector
In the 1990s cost reduction strategies by car assemblers changed the car component industry.
Outside sourcing increased, ultimately raising the size and the scope of the suppliers of key
components. The interdependence of assemblers and suppliers intensified even though
carmakers sold off their component arms. Longer-term relationships through global supply
deals replaced annual bidding contests in which carmakers tried to play their suppliers off
against each other. Assemblers began to allow suppliers earlier access to new vehicle design in
order to pass on R&D projects they did not want to do themselves (Lewis & Wright, 1999).
Consolidation in the industry promoted the emergence of fewer but increasingly powerful
component suppliers, so-called system integrators; this, in turn, shifted the bargaining between
suppliers and assemblers in favour of the former. In components, the fastest growth area is
electronic on-board systems, an example of the rising technological contribution to the value
of a car. It suggests that the scope for technology sharing – between assemblers and system
integrators – and technology transfer – between one or both of the former and lower-tier
suppliers – is on the rise (Bursa et al., 1997; Virag & Mount, 1998). Opportunities for
investments in relation-specific assets are likely to increase, with attendant consequences for
the use of vertical restraints.
Data and methodology
We sent the questionnaire of Appendix A to all Polish firms with more than 20 employees that
the respective national statistical offices, in accordance with NACE codes, classify as car
component manufacturers. In Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, we
used membership directories of relevant trade associations. Our analysis covers all the relevant
locations of the automotive supply sector in the candidate countries. The weighted average
return rate is close to 50 per cent. The questionnaire contains 24 questions on the nature of the
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and technology transfer. Most responses are binary (YES/NO); some are on an integer Likert
scale from 1 to 5 (complexity of the product (1.2), ranking of major markets (1.3), degree of
competition (3.2), competence of suppliers (4.1.3a), relations between buyers and sellers
(4.1.3b), and importance of technology transfer (6.4)); one is a percentage (export share (1.4));
while the rest are not easily codifiable (description of product (1.1), headquarter location
(2.2.1), location of MNE customers (4.2.2.1)). Our local partners translated the questionnaire
from the original English version into their local language. As a test of the reliability of the
translations we had the questionnaires translated back into English by subjects unknown to the
partners.
We would like to test what explains exclusivity in the agreements, and what explains
technology transfer. These variables take on the values YES (1) and NO (0), giving a binary
dependent variable. We test our hypotheses using logit models (see Hutcheson & Sofroniou
(1999) for an introduction and Liao (1994) for a guide on how to interpret probability models
such as the logit model).
The (multiple) logit model is specified as
where Pr(y = 1) is the probability that the response variable takes on the value 1 (as opposed
to 0), B0 is the coefficient to the constant and Bi is the coefficient to the i’th explanatory
variable xi. The interpretation of the model is that the odds may be written as
where  x = (x1, x2, … xk) is the vector of explanatory variables. Thus if B1 is negative the odds
of observing y = 1 decrease as the explanatory variable increases ceteris paribus. If, for
example, B1 = -.6931 so that eB1 = .5, then the odds of observing y = 1 is half as big if x1 = 1 as
when x1 = 0. In the tables below we report both B1 and eB1. Many of our explanatory variables
are themselves binary or take on integer values on a Likert scale. In this case the
corresponding eB1 may be interpreted as the change in the odds of y = 1 that follows from the
presence of the attribute represented by x1 or from an increase by one unit in the attribute
represented by the scale, respectively.
Descriptive statistics of the database
Technology is an important characteristic of automotive supply networks in Eastern Europe.
61 per cent of the sample report to receive – and 47 per cent to transfer – technology. Roughly
two thirds of the firms engage in some form of R&D. However, on average products are
regarded as only weakly complex. Exclusivity is also widespread. This happens more
frequently downstream than upstream. Customers request exclusivity from the respondent in
36 per cent of the cases and the respondent in turn requests it from its customers in 19 per cent
of the cases. The similar upstream numbers are roughly half the downstream numbers. The
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6unconditional probability that a respondent firm has no experience with exclusivity at all is 39
percent.
Firms export 44 per cent of what they produce. They sell mostly to final assemblers
(who are often MNEs), but half of them sell to suppliers and a relatively large number sells
directly to retailers (in the aftermarket). Note that a respondent firm may have several types of
customers (i.e. both final assemblers and other suppliers). Domestic ownership is predominant
with two thirds of the cases. Firms source mostly both at home and abroad.
Table 1. – Descriptive statistics of the questionnaire-based database
Questions Number of
observations
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
deviation
Complexity 413 1 5 3.50 1.10
Export share 311 0 100 43.82 35.99
Ownership
Domestic 413 0 1 .62 .48
Foreign 413 0 1 .26 .44
Mixed 413 0 1 .12 .32
Part of MNE 412 0 1 .28 .45
Value chain
Source…
…at home 413 0 1 .16 .37
…abroad 413 0 1 .16 .37
…both 413 0 1 .68 .47
Sell to…
…suppliers 413 0 2 .48 .51
…assemblers 413 0 4 .76 .46
…retailers 413 0 1 .43 .50
…MNEs 413 0 1 .71 .45
Exclusivity (see Figure 1)
ECR 411 0 1 .36 .48
ERC 413 0 1 .19 .40
ESR 413 0 1 .19 .39
ERS 413 0 1 .08 .26
Technology transfer
Do R&D? 413 0 2 .64 .49
TT…
…to supplier 413 0 1 .47 .50
…from buyer 413 0 1 .61 .49
…important? 413 1 5 3.36 1.44
Note: For information on all codable answers, see Appendix A.1.
Results on exclusivity and technology transfer
7Before undertaking the econometric modelling we looked at correlations between the
variables. Table 2 reports simple Pearson correlation coefficients with corresponding tests for
significance. It is evident from the table that the presence of the four types of exclusive
agreements is significantly and positively correlated between themselves and that the same is
the case for technology transfer from buyers and technology transfer to suppliers. It is also
noteworthy that there is no immediate link (i.e. no significant correlation) between technology
transfer and exclusive agreements.
Table 2. – Correlation coefficients between exclusive agreement (questions 5)
and technology transfer (questions 6)
Pearson
Correlation
Q5.1 Q5.2 Q5.3 Q5.4 Q6.2 Q6.3
Q5.1
Significance
N
1.000
.
412
**     .310
.000
412
**     .219
.000
412
**     .185
.000
412
-.035
.481
412
-.034
.497
412
Q5.2
Significance
N
**      .310
.000
412
1.000
.
414
**     .410
.000
414
.020
.687
414
.020
.687
414
-.023
.644
414
Q5.3
Significance
N
**      .219
.000
412
**     .410
.000
414
1.000
.
414
**     .359
.000
414
.087
.076
414
.013
.793
414
Q5.4
Significance
N
**     .185
.000
412
**     .302
.000
414
**     .359
.000
414
1.000
.
414
.065
.189
414
-.036
.464
414
Q6.2
Significance
N
-.035
.481
412
.020
.687
414
.087
.076
414
.065
.189
414
1.000
.
414
**     .301
.000
414
Q6.3
Significance
N
-.034
.497
412
-.023
.644
414
.013
.793
414
-.036
.464
414
**     .301
.000
414
1.000
.
414
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed)
We ran a series of logit regressions to check the link between technology transfer,
vertical restraints, and other variables included in our questionnaire. Table 3 reports our
preferred regression explaining technology transfer to suppliers (answer to question 6.2; for a
description of the model and the model selection procedure, see Appendix B). 47 percent of
the firms reported to have transferred technology upstream. Table 3 shows that the odds that a
firm will transfer technology to its own suppliers are almost three times higher if it receives
technology from its own customers (Q.6.3). The odds quadruple if the respondent firm
undertakes R&D (Q.6.1). Every time the firm thinks that technology transfer allows it to
upgrade product or process on the Likert scale (Q.6.4), the odds increase by a factor of 1.2.
If the suppliers request exclusivity (Q.5.3), the firm is also likely to transfer technology
to those suppliers. This may hint that some suppliers are in a favourable (bargaining) position
and can request both exclusivity and technology from their customers. It is not consistent with
8exclusivity as a protector of technology transfer. If that were the case, we should have found a
link between questions 5.4 and 6.2. But it may hint at protection against hold-up, following
investments into the supplier’s capability to put the transferred technology to use. The
econometric analysis cannot shed light on this question which is one reason why we also did
case studies (see below).
Table 3. – Preferred logit regression explaining technology transfer to suppliers
Xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q2.1A .882 .381 5.370 .020 2.416
Q2.2 1.506 .416 13.095 .000 4.510
Q4.1.2B -.949 .343 7.668 .006 .387
Q4.1.3B .196 .114 2.944 .086 1.216
Q4.2.1B -.576 .282 4.175 .041 .562
Q4.2.2 .790 .296 7.136 .008 2.202
Q5.3 .613 .299 4.194 .041 1.845
Q6.1 1.375 .253 29.583 .000 3.955
Q6.3 1.118 .278 16.115 .000 3.058
Q6.4 .188 .099 3.594 .058 1.206
Constant -4.161 .689 36.467 .000 .016
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .254. Nagelkerke R2 = .339. Predictions are 53.0 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 71.8 percent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix B.
If the firm is domestically owned (Q.2.1A), then the odds in favour of technology
transfer more than double. Similarly, if the respondent is part of a multinational firm (Q.2.2)
the odds increase by a factor of 4.5. By implication, if the firm has mixed or foreign
ownership but is not part of a multinational it will transfer less technology to its suppliers.
This could reflect that joint ventures are generally an inferior, though less risky, entry mode;
technology-intensive firms are more likely to want to wholly control their assets abroad.
Indeed, technology transfer to suppliers depends on how the firm is placed in the value
chain. If the firm sources from foreign suppliers (Q.4.1.2b), the odds that it transfers
technology to those suppliers will be only 39 percent of what they would be if the firm
sourced from domestic (or domestic and foreign) suppliers. This suggests that foreign
suppliers are technology leaders compared to local firms. If the firm sells to final assemblers
(Q.4.2.1b), odds will be only 56 percent of what they would be if customers were other
suppliers or retailers. However, if there are MNEs among the customers, the odds in favour of
technology transfer should be multiplied by 2.2. If the customer is a multinational, final
assembler the odds in favour of technology transfer to own suppliers should be multiplied by
2.202 x 0.562 = 1.24. Hence multinational networks generate technology transfer while non-
multinational final assemblers – with, for example, Romanian Olcit or, until its takeover by
Renault, Dacia a rare breed in the car industry – do not.
Technology transfer from customers happened to 60.7 percent of the firms. To a large
extent this is connected with whether the firm itself transfers technology to its suppliers (see
Table 4). The odds of getting technology transferred from the buyer almost triple if the firm
transfers technology to its own suppliers (Q.6.2), and double for every unit of increase on the
9Likert scale regarding the importance of technology transfer (Q.6.4). The odds also double if
the customer is a final assembler (Q.4.2.1b). If there are MNEs among the customers (Q.4.2.2)
the odds almost double again. If there are MNE final assemblers among the customers, the
odds thus quadruple. However, if the respondent is part of an MNE (Q.2.2) then the odds are
only 36 percent of what they would have been if the respondent were not part of an MNE.
This could be because it then receives the technology in-house so that an equity link replaces
the protection by exclusivity clauses (cf. above). It is noteworthy that exclusivity enters the
regression insignificantly but with an unexpected sign. If the respondent indicates that its
customers request it not to sell to their competitors (Q.5.1) then the odds in favour of
technology transfer from the customers is cut by a third! This is certainly inconsistent with the
hypothesis that the exclusive agreement is there to protect technology transfer.
Table 4. – Preferred logit regression explaining technology transfer from buyers
xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q2.2 -1.024 .302 11.485 .001 .359
Q4.2.1B .734 .289 6.437 .011 2.083
Q4.2.2 .567 .303 3.508 .061 1.764
Q5.1 -.397 .264 2.265 .132 .672
Q6.2 1.017 .260 15.291 .000 2.765
Q6.4 .830 .098 72.084 .000 2.294
Constant -3.198 .424 56.842 .000 .041
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .312. Nagelkerke R2 = .423. Predictions are 60.7 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 78.8 per cent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix C.
We now turn to explaining the firm’s use of exclusive agreements (see Table 5, and
Appendix D for more details). We investigate ECR (Q.5.1), ERC (Q.5.2), ESR (Q.5.3) and
ERS (Q.5.4) in turn. Exclusivity requested by the customer and granted by the respondent
(ECR) occurred in 36.3 percent of the cases.
Table 5 – Preferred logit regression explaining occurrence of ECR
xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q1.3A .175 .087 4.055 .044 1.191
Q2.2 -.694 .261 7.087 .008 .500
Q5.2 1.332 .293 20.733 .000 3.788
Q5.3 .675 .297 5.178 .023 1.964
Constant -1.117 .211 27.995 .000 .327
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .121. Nagelkerke R2 = .166. Predictions are 63.7 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 71.0 percent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix D.
Odds in favour of observing ECR quadruple if ERC also occurs. They double if ESR is
used and if the firm is not part of a multinational firm. There is a small positive effect of the
domestic market being relatively unimportant. The first finding points to a certain level of
reciprocity of the exclusive agreements. However, we do not know from our questionnaire
whether the customer involved in an ECR agreement is the same customer that is involved in
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ERC. The second finding, that respondents that grant exclusivity to their customers also grant
it to their suppliers may indicate a weak bargaining position of the respondent. This is
consistent with the third finding, namely that firms who are not part of MNEs are ceteris
paribus twice as likely to being subjected to ECR. Note, however, that the model only predicts
34.9 percent of the occurrences of ECR correctly (but 91.6 percent of the non-occurrences) so
that the major part of the occurrence of ECR is left unexplained.
Table 6. – Preferred logit regression explaining occurrence of ERC
xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q1.3C -.242 .107 5.109 .024 .785
Q4.1.2A .777 .400 3.772 .052 2.175
Q4.2.1B .592 .342 3.002 .083 1.808
Q5.1 1.392 .297 21.936 .000 4.023
Q5.3 2.119 .318 44.421 .000 8.320
Q6.1 .810 .329 6.055 .014 2.248
Constant -3.291 .486 45.905 .000 .037
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .216. Nagelkerke R2 = .346. Predictions are 80.8 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 84.9 percent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix D.
Exclusivity requested by the respondent and granted by the customer (ERC) occurs in
19.2 percent of the cases (see Table 6, and Appendix E for details). Odds in favour of
observing ERC quadruple if ECR (Q.5.1) also occurs – a mirror image of what we found in
Table 5. “Reciprocity”, in other words, is still at work. Even more dominantly, ESR (Q.5.3)
enters the equation. Odds have to be multiplied by a factor of eight if the respondent has also
been requested to grant exclusivity to its suppliers. This indicates a tendency to “pass on”
exclusivity clauses downstream. In addition, ERC odds increase by a factor of almost three if
the respondent undertakes R&D (Q.6.1). This could indicate the use of ERC to protect
investment in R&D against downstream opportunism. ERC odds decrease by 1/5 if the EU is
the more important market (Q.1.3C), perhaps reflecting again the bargaining position of the
respondent. If the respondent sources from domestic suppliers alone (Q.4.1.2A), ERC odds
increase by a factor of 2.2. This could be taken to indicate an attempt to create barriers to
foreign competition for firms that are predominantly domestic. If the firm sources
domestically and sells primarily to the domestic market, odds are much higher that ERC will
be used. Finally, ERC will occur more frequently if the customer is a final assembler
(Q.4.2.1b), i.e. is not another supplier or a retailer. In this case the model predicts 39.2 percent
of the occurrences of ERC correctly (but 95.8 percent of the non-occurrences), leaving the
major part of the occurrence of ERC unexplained.
Exclusivity requested by the supplier and granted by the respondent (ESR) occurs in
18.4 percent of the cases (see Table 7, and Appendix F for details). ESR odds again increase
by a factor 8.6 if ERC (Q.5.2) is also present. This does not imply causality. Table 6 showed
that ESR increases the odds of ERC by a factor of 8, and Table 7 shows that this works both
ways. In addition the presence of ERS increases the odds of ESR by a factor of 6, suggesting
that the reciprocity may be at work in upstream contracts, too.
Table 7. – Preferred logit regression explaining occurrence of ESR
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xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q4.1.3A -.365 .143 6.515 .011 .694
Q5.2 2.147 .328 42.959 .000 8.562
Q5.4 1.793 .468 14.694 .000 6.010
Q6.1 -.691 .334 4.284 .038 .501
Q6.2 .666 .319 4.356 .037 1.947
Constant -.936 .534 3.074 .080 .392
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .193. Nagelkerke R2 = .313. Predictions are 81.6 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 85.4 percent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix F.
The more the respondents agree that the capabilities and competence of suppliers are
high (Q.4.1.3A), the lower the ESR odds. This finding is also at odds with an efficiency
explanation of exclusivity. We would have expected the opposite sign if more competent and
capable suppliers wanted to protect their knowledge by requesting exclusivity from their
customers.
The technology variables R&D (Q.6.1) and technology transfer to suppliers (Q.6.2) are
significant in explaining ESR. If the respondent firm undertakes R&D, its odds of having an
ESR imposed are cut in half. Perhaps the respondent has a better bargaining position if it has
the resources to undertake R&D. Or, due to its R&D activity, the firm may be less in need of
technology transfer. If the respondent transfers technology to its suppliers then ESR odds that
(some of) the respondent’s suppliers request exclusivity almost double. As alluded to above,
this could be both a case of market dominance or protection against hold-up, with potentially
diametrical effects on market competition.
Table 8. – Preferred logit regression explaining occurrence of ERS
xi Bi S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(Bi)
Q1.3E -.614 .203 9.112 .003 .541
Q1.4 -.028 .009 10.627 .001 .972
Q4.2.1A .993 .497 3.991 .046 2.698
Q5.1 .877 .523 2.814 .093 2.405
Q5.2 1.059 .533 3.952 .047 2.883
Q5.3 1.794 .512 12.251 .000 6.012
Constant -1.143 .907 1.587 .208 .319
Note: The Cox and Snell R2 is .160. Nagelkerke R2 = .365. Predictions are 91.6 percent
correct if only a constant is used but 91.9 percent correct if the model is used. For a summary
of the model, see Appendix G (and H).
Exclusivity requested by the respondent and granted by a supplier (ERS) happens in
only 7.5 percent of the cases (see Table 8, and Appendix G for details). As in the two previous
models, the presence of other kinds of exclusivity – ECR (Q.5.1), ERC (Q.5.2) and in
particular ESR (Q.5.3) – greatly increase the ERS odds. This again illustrates reciprocity and
pass-on of exclusive agreements. In addition the location and nature of buyers change the
odds. If the customers are primarily found in the rest of the world (Q.1.3e) – i.e. not in the
home market, in the CEEC & CIS, or the OECD – then the odds are reduced. An explanation
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for this may be that firms with their most important markets outside the regional bloc to which
they belong and outside the most important home countries of MNEs tend to be less integrated
in the local networks and source freely on the global market. When the export percentage
(Q.1.4) goes up, ERS odds go (a little) down. This again may be because an export-oriented
firm is also more likely to source freely on the global market and not to try to bind its
suppliers. Finally, if the respondent’s customer is itself a supplier (as opposed to a final
assembler or retailer) then ERS odds triple. Recall from Table 6 that the ERC odds increased
if its customer was a final assembler. In combination these findings thus show that the
respondent’s use of exclusivity clauses depends on its position in the supply chain. Lower-(i.e.
second-, third-, etc.)tier suppliers are more likely to use ERS while first-tier suppliers are more
prone to use ERC.
Unfortunately we do not have data on export share (Q.1.4) for Romania and Slovakia.
This means that Table 8 is based on data from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovenia alone, a total of 310 out of 411 firms. To check the robustness of the findings, we did
a similar regression leaving the export share out of the regression thus exploiting the whole
data set. The results are shown in Appendix H and prove to be fairly robust to the omission of
an important explanatory variable.
Ex ante we thought there would be a close link between product quality and
complexity (Q1.2) on the one hand and exclusivity on the other, much as we thought we
would find it between technology transfer and exclusivity. However, we never found a
significant link between the two. To ensure that this was not due to the subjective bias in the
respondents’ self-assessment of the complexity of their products, we calculated the unit values
of their main products. We used Eurostat’s Comext database and computed unit values up to
8-digit codes of the Nimex classification for 217 products, roughly one half of our firm
sample. Complexity is not significantly related to the unit values of the exported products of
our firms’ home countries. This could indeed confirm suspicions of respondent subjectivity,
except that unit values – like complexity – are also not significantly related to technology
transfer or exclusivity. Hence, this is yet another puzzling result which we interviewed
individual firms about.
Case Studies
To throw light on the puzzle of why TT and VRs behave differently than expected, we
contacted firms that had reported VRs, in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.
We assembled more than 30 case studies that are only summarised here (see Lorentzen &
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Møllgaard (forthcoming) for an exhaustive analysis). Interviews in the four countries were
held in the same format (see Appendix I). They focused on
• the way in which complexity, technology transfer, and vertical restraints are related
• how firms bargain about exclusive agreements
• what determines each party’s bargaining position
• the direction and extent of efficiency gains.
The interviewed firms broadly fall into three categories. Two of these actually or
potentially enhance efficiency while one has anti-competitive effects. In the first group, firms
impose VRs to protect TT. Hence, the transfer and the restraint have the same direction. These
cases confirm our initial hypothesis (and save us from having to rewrite theory). In the second
group, firms transfer technology to their suppliers. This requires the recipient firm to invest,
for example in equipment, to be able to put the transferred technology to work. To insure itself
against hold-up by the transferring firm, the supplier then imposes exclusivity. Thus,
technology transfer and vertical restraints do not have the same direction in these cases.
However, as in the first group, the effect of the exclusivity condition is likely to be pro-
competitive. In the third group, firms do not transfer technology but demand exclusivity all the
same. Indeed, these firms that impose or are subject to VRs confirm that product complexity, a
low relative distance to the international technology frontier, or proprietary technology assets
are not at all associated with the exclusivity to which they are part.
Insofar as they are on the receiving end of VRs, this raises the question why firms would
subject themselves to such an asymmetric arrangement. Not much choice, is the answer. For
firms in a sorry financial state or with the need to build up a relationship with a potentially
large customer, there are no first-best alternatives, and so they go for second-best. This means,
inter alia, extremely unfavourable sourcing conditions and restrictions on their customer base
in exchange for guaranteeing some degree of capacity utilisation, plus in the best cases access
to new markets, increases in productivity and profitability, or simply a breathing space for
restructuring. For the individual firm, this sometimes turns out to be less onerous over time
because with an improving bargaining position it manages to renegotiate the stipulations of
the exclusive agreement.
This summary glimpse at results from our case studies confirms a number of insights
hinted at in the econometric analysis. First, exclusivity in inter-firm relationships exists even
in the absence of technology transfer. Firms that impose them do so because exclusivity
allows them to increase market power. Firms that accept them do so either because the
alternative is bankruptcy or because the potential VR partner insists on it – a first-best
alternative is unavailable. Second, VRs may lead to higher prices. Third, when they lead to
lower prices, it is not clear from our analysis whether these gains are passed on down the
value chain to the final user. Fourth, the terms of the VR depend on the relative bargaining
power of each party to the agreement. In East-West business relationships, as firms in
transition economies restructure successfully, their control over resources may change over
time, and with this the terms of the VR. The graduation away from VRs unassociated with
technology transfer does not guarantee a more competitive market (only a different
distribution of profits), but it does make it more likely. Fifth, competition authorities in CEE
as well as the European Commission appear to be largely unaware of these practices. None of
the sample firms had notified the respective authorities of its VR agreement, and only one
professed to be familiar with the relevant legislation. Sixth, in the area of competition policy,
the institutional remake of CEE has some way to go before it resembles EU practice. VR
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agreements are typically tacit rather than formalised into contracts. Dawnraids  are no answer
if anti-competitive practices never make it onto a – however well hidden – piece of paper.
Conclusion
Our three main results are, loosely put, that exclusive agreements and TT explain themselves
but not really each other. Exclusive agreements come in bundles, are to some extent
reciprocal, and are passed on up- or downstream. When faced with a request for exclusivity by
its customer, a firm seems likely to respond in kind. Also, the imposition of exclusive
agreements at one point of the value chain appears to translate into other exclusivity clauses
further up or further down, thus linking different tiers of suppliers and assemblers. We found
that first-tier suppliers are more prone to request exclusivity from their customers while lower-
tier suppliers are more likely to request it from their suppliers. Likewise, firms that are
technology recipients are more likely than those that are not to also pass on knowledge to
other firms. Both of these findings suggest that technological competence is diffused along the
automotive value chain, especially among upper-tier suppliers and assemblers, and that firms
organise in networks. So the East European car component sector reflects the key
technological and organisational trends, including probably the presence of the new breed of
so-called 0.5 tier suppliers, that characterise the world automotive industry. No small feat for
an industry that only a decade ago produced only outdated and unreliable vehicles for a
captive demand. It also suggests that investments in the East European automotive sector led
to technological spillovers with the potential to upgrade local productive capabilities.
Exclusivity and technology transfer are relatively weakly linked. We found weak
evidence that the presence of exclusivity requested by the customer decreases the likelihood of
getting technology from customers. Likewise, technology transfer to the supplier increases the
likelihood of suppliers requesting exclusivity (or if the supplier requests exclusivity, then the
respondent is more likely to transfer technology to suppliers). These findings may be
interpreted as indicating that in some cases the rationale for exclusivity is not the protection of
technology or knowledge transfer but rather the protection of market power or the use of
bargaining power to influence the cui bono in inter-firm relations. In other cases – this is the
benign version – the protection is merely aimed at assuaging hold-up problems and thus
without anti-competitive intent. We also found some evidence that R&D matters to the
exclusivity that the respondent requests of customers in which case it may be efficiency
enhancing or pro-competitive.
That exclusivity in contracts and TT do not explain each other more strongly was an
unexpected result. Investor motivations, entry mode, government incentives, or the relative
residual strength of the indigenous component supply sector may influence the kinds of
exclusive agreements imposed and their impact on TT. For example, foreign car
manufacturers more than in any other CEE invested in Poland for its large market and fast-
growing demand. The government put high tariffs on vehicle imports and provided incentives
for carmakers to undertake assembly in the country. By contrast, in the Czech Republic VW’s
strategy from the beginning was aimed at the domestic and export markets. In Hungary,
foreign investors created an automotive supply industry ex novo, and the country continues to
specialise in components rather than final assemblies. The different circumstances may have
influenced how foreign manufacturers bargained with local firms and with host governments,
thus influencing the context in which exclusive agreements were imposed.
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Our results may herald a problem for car assemblers and component suppliers. With
pre-accession in full swing (and, thus, the gradual extension of EU law in CEE) firms had
better think hard about the justification for exclusive agreements. For competition authorities
will surely ask questions about them.
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire for Car Component Suppliers
Purpose
To understand the existence, frequency, and effect of vertical restraints in the car component
supplier industry.
___________________________________________________________________________
1 Product and sales
1.1 What do you produce?
………………………………………………………………………………………
1.2 Please indicate how well the following statement describes the nature of your product:
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
“Our product is highly complex and technical.” [  ]
1.3 What are your major markets? (Please rank in order of importance: 1>2>3>4>5.)
Domestic [  ]
CEEC&CIS [  ]
EU [  ]
Other OECD [  ]
Rest of world [  ]
1.4 What is the share of exports in production (in per cent)? [  ]
2 Ownership
2.1     Domestic [  ]
Foreign [  ]
Mixed [  ]
(Please tick as appropriate.)
2.2 Are you part of a multinational firm? Yes [  ]
No [  ]
2.2.1 If yes, in which country is this firm headquartered?
………………………………………………………………………………………..
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3 Competition and market structure
3.1 Where are your main competitors?
At home [  ]
Abroad [  ]
Both [  ]
(Please tick as appropriate.)
3.2 Please indicate how well the following statements describe your business environment:
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
a) “Domestic competition is intense.” [  ]
b) “Global competition is intense.” [  ]
4 Value chain
4.1 Inputs
4.1.1 What do you source?
………………………………………………………………………………………
4.1.2 From whom do you source?
Domestic suppliers [  ]
Foreign suppliers [  ]
Both [  ]
4.1.3 Please indicate how well the following statement describes your business environment:
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
a) “Capabilities and competence of suppliers are high.” [  ]
b) “Relationships between suppliers and buyers are strong.” [  ]
4.2 Output
4.2.1 Who buys your product?
(Please tick as appropriate.)
Other suppliers [  ]
Final assemblers [  ]
Retailers [  ]
4.2.2 Are there MNEs among your customers? Yes [  ]
No [  ]
4.2.2.1 If yes, in which country are they headquartered?
…………………………………………………………………………………
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5 Vertical restraints
5.1 Do (some of) your customers request that you not sell to their competitors?
Yes [  ]
No [  ]
5.2 Do you request that (some of) your customers not buy your product from alternative
suppliers?
Yes [  ]
No [  ]
5.3 Do  (some of) your suppliers request that you not purchase their product from other
suppliers?
Yes [  ]
No [  ]
5.4 Do you request that (some of) your suppliers not sell their product to your competitors?
Yes [  ]
No [  ]
6 Technology
6.1 Do you undertake R&D? Yes [  ]
No [  ]
6.2 Do you pass on technology and/or knowledge to your suppliers? Yes [  ]
No [  ]
6.3 Do you receive technology and/or knowledge from your buyers? Yes [  ]
No [  ]
6.4 Please indicate how well the following statements describe technology transfer with
your buyers:
(1= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree)
a)     “The technology transfer allows us to upgrade what we make and how we make it.”    [  ]
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APPENDIX A.1. – Descriptive Statistics from Answers to Questionnaire
Question Number of
observations
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
deviation
Complexity
Q1.2 413 1 5 3.50 1.10
Major markets
Q1.3A 413 1 5 1.87 1.28
Q1.3B 413 1 5 3.55 1.34
Q1.3C 413 1 5 2.48 1.55
Q1.3D 413 1 5 3.90 1.21
Q1.3E 413 1 5 4.10 1.25
Export share
Q1.4 311 0 100 43.82 35.99
Ownership
Q2.1A 413 0 1 .62 .48
Q2.1B 413 0 1 .26 .44
Q2.1C 413 0 1 .12 .32
Q2.2 412 0 1 .28 .45
Competition and market structure
Q3.1A 413 0 1 .12 .32
Q3.1B 413 0 1 .38 .49
Q3.1C 413 0 1 .38 .49
Q3.2A 412 1 5 2.93 1.46
Q3.2B 413 1 5 4.39 1.10
Value chain
Q4.1.2A 413 0 1 .16 .37
Q4.1.2B 413 0 1 .16 .37
Q4.1.2C 413 0 1 .68 .47
Q4.1.3A 412 1 5 3.59 1.02
Q4.1.3B 412 1 5 3.58 1.10
Q4.2.1A 413 0 2 .48 .51
Q4.2.1B 413 0 4 .76 .46
Q4.2.1C 413 0 1 .43 .50
Q4.2.2 413 0 1 .71 .45
Exclusivity
Q5.1 (ECR) 411 0 1 .36 .48
Q5.2 (ERC) 413 0 1 .19 .40
Q5.3 (ESR) 413 0 1 .19 .39
Q5.4 (ERS) 413 0 1 .08 .26
Technology transfer
Q6.1 R&D? 413 0 2 .64 .49
Q6.2 to supplier 413 0 1 .47 .50
Q6.3 from buyer 413 0 1 .61 .49
Q6.4 important? 413 1 5 3.36 1.44
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NOTES TO APPENDICES B-H:
Logistic regression is used when you want to be able to predict the presence or absence of a
characteristic or outcome based on values of a set of predictor variables. It is suited to models
where the response variable is dichotomous or binary. Logistic regression coefficients can be
used to estimate odds ratios for each explanatory variable in the model. Model selection and
estimation can be carried out using  a number of methods: Block entry is a procedure for
variable selection in which the named variables are entered in a single step without checking
any of the entry criteria except tolerance. Forward conditional is a stepwise selection method
with entry testing based on the significance of the score statistic, and removal testing based on
the probability of a likelihood-ratio statistic based on conditional parameter estimates.
Backward conditional is a backward stepwise selection method in which removal testing is
based on the probability of the likelihood-ratio statistic based on conditional parameter
estimates. We ran forward and backward selection before settling on a particular model. For
reasons of space we only report the results of the final block entry procedure that summarises
the models well.
Classification tables. Prints a table of the observed versus predicted responses. You will find
one for the “Beginning Block” which is for a logit model that only includes a constant and one
for “Block 1: Method = Enter” which is for the model where using the block entry procedure
all the suggested variables are entered simultaneously. Comparing the two classification tables
allows comparisons of how well responses are predicted with and without the model. The cut
value is .5 meaning that the model predicts a 1 if the predicted probability is greater than .5.
Chi-square goodness-of-fit test gives a test of how well a model fits the observed data.
-2 Log Likelihood or the deviance is another measure of how well the model fits the data.
The smaller the value the better the fit. In stepwise methods, the change in -2 log likelihood
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the terms removed from the model are zero.
R Square or R2 is a measure of the fraction of the variation in the data that is explained by the
model (Cox & Snell 1981).
S.E.: Standard Error
Wald statistic tests the hypothesis that the regression coefficient for the explanatory variable
is zero (i.e. that the explanatory variable has no effect on the response variable).
For a further discussion of these statistics related to logit models, see Hutcheson & Sofroniou
(1999, chap.4).
Appendices B-H are available at the project's home page:
http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/staff/pmoellgaard/P97-8122R.htm
23
APPENDIX I
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH
SELECT CAR COMPONENT SUPPLIERS (OR THEIR CUSTOMERS)1
Purpose
To understand
• in what way complexity, technology transfer, and vertical restraints are (or are not) related
• how firms bargain about exclusive agreements
• what determines each firm’s bargaining position
• to what extent the (efficiency) gains resulting from the interaction between firms remain
exclusive to the directly involved parties, spill-over to other firms, and/or are passed on to
consumers.
A Complexity
1. What does the complexity of the product consist of?
2. Where does the international technology frontier lie in this product area? Who drives it
(i.e. who are the main players)? Where is innovation most likely to come from in this
area? [To frame your questions please make use of the background material about
individual product categories in the FT survey on the automotive supply industry.]
3. How distant are you from this frontier? Why? What is your best bet of bridging the gap?
B Technology transfer
I. If you are a technology transfer recipient…
1. … what exactly is being transferred?
2. … does it upgrade what you make (product), how you make it (process), or something
else?
3. … is the upgrade incremental (i.e. based on your previous capabilities) or does it introduce
a genuinely new competence?
4. … could you have (easily) acquired this technology on the open market?
5. … did you produce this or a similar technology even prior to the transfer from your
partner?
1. If you are not a technology transfer recipient…
1. …why not?
                                                          
1 Only interview an assembler if you have one of its suppliers among your other case studies.
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Note: Sections C-D only for firms who have VRs in place.
C Vertical restraints
1. What does the VR consist of (i.e. what does the agreement say: scope, sanctions etc.)?
How long is it valid for?
2. Why did you consent to an exclusive agreement?
3. Are you familiar with regulations concerning VRs in your country/in the EU?
4. Did you notify any authorities about the VR? If no, why not? If yes, how did they react?
D Bargaining
1. Is the agreement a standard contract specific only to the relationship in question (i.e.
supplier to firm X must not sell to anyone else), or does it reflect your own situation as a
manufacturer in terms of where you source from; who you sell to; who and where your
competitors are; who and where your VR-party’s competitors are?
2. Did you negotiate the agreement or did you just sign up to it? Did you change any of its
provisions? Which?
3. Did you have problems (financial or otherwise) when you agreed to the VR?
4. Were you familiar with VRs or was this your first exclusive agreement?
E Gains from relationship
1. Has the relationship with your partner (i.e. the firm that imposes a VR, transfers
technology, or both) improved what you make and how you make it, or how you get your
product to the (which) market(s)? Has it broadened your value-added scope?
2. Have you become more productive?
3. Have you become more profitable?
4. Have you lowered prices? If yes, who benefited from this?
5. Has the relationship with your partner changed your relationships with other suppliers or
customers? In what way?
